This paper examines the emerging patterns and economic implications of Indian overseas direct investment (ODI) from a historical perspective. The novelty of the analysis lies in its specific focus on the implications of the liberalization reforms initiated in the early 1990s and the resultant changes in the overall investment climate for the internationalisation of domestic companies. The findings cast doubts on the popular perception that the recent surge in ODI from India is an unmixed economic blessing, a sign of "coming of age" of Indian companies in global business. Given the remaining distortion in the domestic investment climate, the net national gains from these investments could be much less than what the reported absolute numbers suggest.
Introduction
The rapid growth of overseas direct investment (ODI) by firms in developing countries has been an important feature of economic globalization over the past three decades. Firms from India have become an integral part of this process. Though the sprouting of Indian overseas investment was noticed in the early 1960s, most of the foreign affiliates set up by Indian firms during the ensuing two decades were small-or medium-scale ventures and annual total outflows remained small, in the range of US$ 3 to 5 million. With the progressive relaxation of restrictions on overseas investment as part of the The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the changes in government policy relating to outward FDI in the context of major shifts in trade and investment policy regimes. Section 3 examines the trends and patterns of outward FDI from India from a comparative perspective. Section 4 deals with sources of competitive advantages of Indian MNEs. Section 5 discusses the main drivers of their overseas expansion. The final section offers concluding remarks.
Policy setting
The overriding aim of the development policy of the successive five-year plans in India, starting with the first plan launched in 1952, was across-the-board import substitution, in the context of a foreign trade regime that relied extensively on quantitative restrictions (Bhagwati and Desai 1970; Panagariya 2008) . Emphasis was placed on the development of capital-intensive industries, which were expected to bring the benefit of technology and industrial linkages to the rest of the economy. In 1969 the government enacted the Monopolies and Restricted Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, which contained strong measures to curb the economic power of the top business houses. Under the MRTP Act, all firms above a certain asset base were restricted from entry into almost all sectors of the industry, and even an expansion of existing plants required permission from the government on a case-by-case basis (Encarnation 1982) .
Export-oriented firms in traditional industries were the first to face the constraining effects of government policy. As a response, these firms ventured into other developing countries, mostly in Southeast Asia, which were more open to trade and investment. The first government policy guidelines for approving and monitoring overseas direct investment were issued in 1969. Overseas investment by Indian firms was permitted only in minority-owned joint ventures abroad, unless the foreign government and foreign partner firm desired otherwise. As regards the mode of financing of these projects, the government severely restricted cash remittances for equity participation and only encouraged the export of capital equipment from India. Outward foreign investment criteria were somewhat liberalized in the mid 1980s, but the basic emphasis on the balance of payments implications of the investment projects remained largely unaltered during that decade. The liberalization-cum-structural adjustment reforms initiated in 1991 marked a clear departure from the state-led import substitution policy of the previous four decades (Panagariya 2008) . As part of the new policy emphasis, relaxation of restrictions on overseas investment began in 1992. The first step in this regard was the introduction of an automatic route for overseas investment up to US$ 2 million with a cash component not exceeding US$ 0.5 million in a block of 3 years. The requirement of minority capital participation was replaced by a requirement to conform to the rules and regulations of the host country. Indian companies were permitted the capitalization of service fees and royalties to meet equity participation, to obtain foreign currency loans abroad, and to grant loans to their foreign joint ventures with Indian parent companies. In some cases, direct cash remittances to joint ventures were also permitted.
Work relating to approvals for overseas investment was transferred from the Ministry of Commerce to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) with a view to create a single window clearance mechanism. A fast track route was adopted where the investment limits were raised from US$ 2 million to US$ 4 million, though cash remittance continued to be restricted to US$ 0.5 million. Beyond US$ 4 million, approvals were considered under Normal Route at the Special Committee level comprising representatives of the RBI and different ministries. Investment proposals in excess of US$ 15 million were considered by the Ministry of Finance and were generally approved if the required resources were raised through the global depository receipts route. The neutrality condition governing overseas investment approval (which stipulated that the amount of outward investment should be repatriated in full by way of dividends and royalty within a period of 5 years) was abolished in 1999.
Under the Foreign Exchange Management Act introduced in June 2000, the upper limit for automatic overseas investment approval was raised to US$ 50 million in 2000 and US$ 100 million in 2002. In March 2003, firms were allowed to invest up to 100 percent of their net worth under the automatic approval route. In 2005, this limit was further raised to 200 percent of net worth, prior approval from the RBI was dispensed with, and firms were permitted to remit funds through any authorized foreign exchange dealer. Commensurate with the build-up of foreign exchange reserves, the limit on outward investment was further raised to 300 percent of net worth in 2007 and 400 percent of net worth in 2008. Registered "trusts" and "societies" engaged in manufacturing, education, and hospital sectors were allowed to set up a joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary in the same sector outside India. Indian firms can now make overseas direct investment in any activity except certain real estate activities and banking (Khan 2012) . Since 2003, Indian commercial banks have been permitted to extend credit to Indian companies for outward investments. In 2006, the prudential limit on bank financing was raised from 10 percent to 20 percent of overseas investment. Indian firms' access to international financial markets was also progressively liberalized. To help firms raise capital abroad, unlisted Indian companies are allowed to list on overseas stock exchanges without having to be publicly traded on domestic stock exchanges. Since 2004, overseas direct investment was included as a permissible end-use of external commercial borrowing.
Notwithstanding these significant reforms, there are still many unresolved issues relating to the overall investment climate (Panagariya 2008; Athukorala 2014) . Although the "license raj" has been largely eliminated at the center, it still exists at the state level, along with a pervasive "inspector raj." Private investors require a large number of permissions (e.g., for electricity and water supply connections and water supply clearance) from the state governments to start a business; they must also deal with the state bureaucracy in the course of day-to-day operations. Stringent labor laws, high corporate tax rates, and a weak bankruptcy framework are also prominent issues. Other constraints that stand in the way of industrial growth include an inadequate supply of physical infrastructure (especially power) and a highly inefficient and cumbersome land acquisition procedure. These issues are reflected in India's poor ranking among the countries in the region-in particular, among the dynamic export-oriented economies in East Asia-in terms of various indicators of ease of doing businesses. The World Bank's annual "Doing Business 2016" ranked India 130 out of 189 countries in the ease of doing business index. So far, however, no systematic attempt has been made to examine the implication of these remaining distortions in the domestic investment environment for outward investment by Indian firms.
Trends and patterns of ODI
The first overseas Indian venture was a textile mill set up in Ethiopia in 1959 by the Birla Group of companies, India's second largest business conglomerate at the time (Kudaisya 2003) . The following year, the Birla Group set up an engineering unit in Kenya. In 1962, the Shriram group set up a sewing machine assembly plant in Ratmalana, Sri Lanka. The number of overseas ventures increased rapidly from the late 1970s as the industrial licensing system became much more stringent as part of the government's move to control big businesses. By 1983, there were 140 foreign investment projects in operation and another 88 in various stages of implementation (Lall 1986 ). Most of the foreign affiliates set up during the 1980s were small-or medium-scale ventures; total stock of ODI in 1990 amounted to only US$ 124 million, accounting for less than 0.1 percent of total stock of ODI from developing economies. The second wave of internationalization of Indian firms began from about 1995 and gathered momentum as foreign exchange restrictions on capital transfers for overseas acquisitions liberalized in successive stages from 2000 (Nagaraj 2006 ). This section first provides an overview of the overall trends and patterns of ODI from India during 2000 to 2014. This is followed by an analysis of the entry modes, major investors, sectoral composition, and geographical distribution of ODI. The analysis is based on data put together from various scattered sources. These sources and the nature/ limitations of the data are detailed in Appendix A.
Trends
The swift response by overseas-investing firms to the progressive relaxation of investment limit and restriction of foreign borrowing for financing overseas investment project is vividly reflected in the data plotted in Figure 1 Until the late 1990s, India's share in FDI outflows from developing economies was much smaller compared with that of Brazil, China, Mexico, and South Africa, the four largest emerging market economies (Athukorala 2009 ). India's relative possession increased notably during the next decade: By the second half of the 2000s, India had surpassed Brazil and Mexico, becoming the second largest foreign direct investor after China among the emerging market economies (Table 1) . However, from about 2010, FDI from Mexico has increased faster, pushing India to the third position in the ranking. Since the early 2000s, China has always accounted for a larger share of total ODI from developing countries (Sung 2007) . The gap between Chinese and Indian ODI has widened significantly from about 2007 (Figure 2 ).
Until about the early 2000s, ODI from India almost entirely took the form of greenfield investment. There were no recorded cases of overseas acquisitions by Indian companies until about the mid 1990s. Given the nature of terms and conditions applicable to overseas investment, all foreign affiliates formed during the period were joint ventures, usually with minority ownership. Further, a disproportionately large share of equity took the form of capital goods exported by the parent companies. in developed economies, and in all acquisitions in developing economies. During the period 2003-14, the value of total acquisitions amounted to US$ 91 billion, accounting for 74 percent of India's total reported FDI outflows. The share of acquisition in Indian overseas FDI is much larger compared with that of China (44 percent) and the average for developing economies (37 percent) during this period (UNCTAD 2015).
The total number of greenfield projects by Indian companies increased from 172 in 2003 to a maximum of 441 in 2011, and then declined to 243 in 2014. During 2003-14, the cumulative value of announced greenfield projects (US$ 229 billion) was about 85 percent higher than the total recorded (balance of payments based) outward FDI (US$ 124 billion). This implies that a significant proportion of greenfield ODI is financed from various forms of non-equity capital, which are not reflected in official FDI statistics. The ratio of cumulative greenfield ODI to cumulative recorded ODI in much higher in India (185 percent) compared with that of China (50 percent) and the average for developing economies (79 percent).
Sectoral composition
During the three decades from the late 1960s onward, more than 80 percent of India's outward FDI was in manufacturing (Lall 1982) . Within manufacturing, Indian overseas ventures were spread over a much broader spectrum of activities than those of other developing countries (Wells 1983 ). Textiles and yarn accounted for a quarter of capital held overseas, followed by paper and pulp, engineering of various types, food processing, and chemicals. Unlike firms from East Asian countries, which used their new locations as export platforms, Indian firms were predominantly engaged in import-substitution production. These features reflected the nature of the highly interventionist and inward-looking nature of the Indian domestic policy regime, which had spawned a highly diversified and inward-oriented domestic manufacturing base.
From about 2005, there has been a notable shift in the sectoral/industry composition of Indian ODI with a notable decline in the share of manufacturing and a corresponding increase in services-related FDI (Table 2) . Between 2008 and 2014, the share of manufacturing declined from 44.6 percent to 18.9 percent, and the share of services increased from 15 percent to nearly 50 percent of total ODI. Financial, insurance, real estate, and business services account for over 40 percent of total services ODI. Other service sectors in which there is significant Indian ODI presence include wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communication services; and construction.
Data on the sectoral composition of the major foreign acquisitions and greenfield investment by Indian firms during 2010-14 compiled respectively from the Grant Thornton and fDi Markets databases are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 . The industry composition of acquisition is broadly similar to that revealed by the RBI data discussed earlier. Within sectors is driven by ONGC Videsh, a state-owned oil and gas firm, which has acquired minority stakes in oil fields in several countries, mainly in Kazakhstan, Mozambique, and Azerbaijan. Within manufacturing, the industry groups with high shares of overseas acquisitions include pharma, healthcare & biotech (6.1 percent), plastic & chemicals (6.0 percent), and metals & ores (4.5 percent), and automotive (2 percent). It is clear that acquisitions, both in services and manufacturing, are heavily concentrated in capital-and skill-intensive activities.
The manufacturing sector appears more prominently in India's greenfield ODI than in acquisitions. During 2010-14, manufacturing accounted for 41 percent of the total value of greenfield ODI, followed by services (30 percent) and resource-based sectors (29 percent). Within manufacturing, the major areas of concentration for greenfield investments are in capital-and skill-intensive industry groups such as metals (13.8 percent), chemicals (8.8 percent), automotive (5.5 percent), and alternative energy (2.7 percent). By contrast, labor-intensive industries such as apparel, footwear, leather products, and food products accounts for a small share. Skill-intensive services such as financial services (5.8 percent), software and IT services (3.8 percent), and R&D and design (3.4 percent) account for a significant share.
The significant share of greenfield investment in the metal industry is accounted for by major investment projects by Essar Group (US$ 11.5 billion), Tata Group (US$ 4.8 billion), NALCO (US$ 2.7 billion), OP Jindal (US$ 2.2 billion), Ispat industries (US$ 1.6 billion), and Aditya Birla Group (US$ 1.4 billion). The major investments in chemicals have been undertaken by GAIL (US$ 4.2 billion), Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers (US$ 3.5 billion), IFFCO (US$ 1.9 billion), Sanmar Group (US$ 1.3 billion), KK Birla Group (US$ 1.1 billion), Tata Group (US$ 1.1 billion), and Nagarjuna Group (US$ 1.1 billion). In the automotive sector, Tata (US$ 6.9 billion) and Mahindra (US$ 5.1 billion) groups have undertaken the major investment projects.
Overall, the sectoral composition of India's ODI over the past decade seems unique compared with that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea at their early stage of economic expansion and also that of China over the past two decades. In those countries, shifting of production bases overseas through FDI in manufacturing was complementary to the ongoing process of industrial transformation through global economic integration. Those countries began industrialization by specializing in the traditional labor-intensive products such as clothing, footwear, toys, and sport goods. As the production of these goods became increasingly uncompetitive in the world markets because of rising wages and rental cost, firms engaged in these industries began to shift production base to low-cost countries in the region and beyond (Wells 1983; Athukorala and Manning 1999) . More recently, firms in vertically integrated high-tech industries (such as electronics, electrical goods, optical equipment, and machine tool) in these countries have begun to shift the labor-intensive segments (slices) of the production process to low-wage cost countries in the region and beyond (Athukorala 2014 ).
In contrast, India's manufacturing ODI remains heavily concentrated in a few capital-and skill-intensive products and in mostly skill-intensive services. Both in terms of the capital/technology intensity of production and the growing importance of natural resourcebased industries in the sectoral composition, India's outward FDI is somewhat similar to that of Brazil and Russia (Goldstein 2009 ). Recent ODI from India is also unique compared with that from the other major developing countries for its heavy concentration in services sectors, in particular business services.
Although outward FDI in some of the services industries, such as IT and software, is consistent with India's comparative advantage in these sectors resulting from the availability of a pool of English-speaking low-cost manpower, 1 the same cannot be said about its outward FDI in capital-and skill-intensive manufacturing industries. In the latter case, 1 Although it is well known that the large scale migration of software professionals from India to the United States played an important role in the growth of India's IT industry, it is also possible that the success of Indian IT professionals in the United States would have created favorable conditions for outward FDI by Indian companies in the software sector.
there is no evidence to suggest that India holds any comparative advantage. Estimates of trade-based revealed comparative advantage indices show that India indeed holds a comparative advantage in IT and software, and its comparative advantage in manufacturing essentially lies in traditional labor-intensive products. Given the pattern of its comparative advantage, the rapid growth of outward FDI from India's skill-and capital-intensive manufacturing industries appear to be a puzzle, whereas that in knowledge-intensive business services (such as software) does not seem paradoxical.
Geographical distribution
Prior to the 1990s, policies in the developing countries, including in India, were in favor of promoting investment flows and technology transfer among themselves under the overall objective of enhancing South-South cooperation (Wells 1983 By the 1990s many developing host countries had embraced global economic integration, albeit at varying degrees, as the basic tenet of their development strategy. With this new policy orientation, and also in a context of waning North-South political tensions, these countries now make decisions on foreign investment based largely on economic considerations rather than specifically favoring investors from developing countries. Consequently, there has been a major transformation in the geographical distribution of ODI by EMNEs over the last two decades. This change is particularly visible in the case of Indian firms as they are increasingly venturing out beyond their traditional domain-other developing countries-to developed countries.
The data maintained by the RBI on ODI covers flow of funds to the "first destination," rather the final destination of investment (the country in which the investment actually takes place). The parent companies, however, channel a significant amount of ODI to third countries through countries with which India has signed bilateral investment treaties (in particular Mauritius), offshore financial centers (such as Singapore and Hong Kong), and tax havens. 2 Therefore, we use data on M&As and greenfield investment, respectively, from Grant Thornton and fDi Markets databases to analyze the geographic profile of Indian ODI. Source: Authors' estimation using data compiled by Grant Thornton.
Note: For the years 2010, 2012, and 2013, the data contain all outbound deals by Indian companies with value greater than US$ 100 million. Data for only top 10 deals are available for the years 2011
and 2014.
The bulk of overseas acquisitions by Indian firms during 2010-14 was in developed countries, with the United States accounting for the largest share (16.6 percent), followed by Europe (8.7 percent), Australia (8.2 percent), and UK (8 percent) (Table 5 ). Together, these four destinations account for 41.5 percent of the total value of acquisitions. When the acquisitions in oil and gas, which are predominantly in developing countries, are excluded, the combined share of these four countries turns out to be as high as 53.4 percent. Almost 60 percent of non-oil and gas acquisitions are in developed countries. Project-level data from the same data source (not reported here for brevity) show that acquisitions in developing countries are mainly concentrated in resource-intensive product categories (such as oil and gas, metals and ores, and mining) whereas that in developed countries is more concentrated in capital-and skill-intensive product categories. Although the resourceseeking motive is the main driver of Indian firms' overseas acquisitions in developing countries, the acquisitions in developed countries are motivated by other considerations such as acquiring technology and brand names (for example, Tata's acquisition of Jaguar and Twining Tea) and consolidation of global market access (for example, Tata Steel's acquisition of Corus).
The data on greenfield investment projects, however, provide a different picture (Table 6 ). The developing countries account for a much higher share of this form of ODI. North America and Western Europe together account for only about 15 percent of the total whereas developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East account for the rest. This pattern does not change significantly even if we exclude resource-based sectors such as coal, oil, natural gas-and extraction. UAE accounts for the largest share (10.1) of non-resource greenfield investment, followed by China (6.8 percent) and Indonesia (6.5 percent). Among the developed countries, UK accounts for the largest share (6.2 percent), followed by the United States (5.6 percent) and Canada (2.5).
The sectoral/industry composition of greenfield investments is much more diversified both in developed and developing countries compared with acquisitions. Further, the relative importance of developed and developing countries as destinations of investment varies significantly among product categories. The high share of UAE is driven by Construction accounting for 34 percent of India's total greenfield investment to this destination followed by oil and natural gas with a share of 31 percent. Within manufacturing, Chemicals account for the highest share of India's investment to the UAE. In the case of China, automotive sector accounts for the largest share (24 percent) of Indian greenfield investment followed by financial services (21 percent). Metals accounts for the largest share (58 percent) of greenfield investment in Indonesia followed by extraction (12.9 percent) and electricity (10.5 percent). In the UK, the leading sectors for greenfield investment are automotive (38 percent) and financial services (18 percent). Finally, for the United States, metals account for the largest share (23 percent), followed by R&D, design, testing (13 percent) and software & IT services (6 percent). Overall, it can be seen that greenfield investments are undertaken by Indian firms with the objective of harnessing the competitive advantage emanating from the host country's resource endowments.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, greenfield investments declined less sharply compared with acquisition (see Figure 3 ). This pattern is consistent with the difference in the host-country composition of the two types of ODI. The developing countries figure predominantly as a destination for greenfield investment whereas developed countries (which were severely affected by the global financial crisis) are the major destinations for outward FDI and M&A.
Players
Unlike in the case of outward FDI from China, where the bulk of outward FDI is undertaken by state-owned or state-controlled firms, Indian outward FDI is predominantly a private sector activity. Many Indian overseas investors are part of large business conglomerates. Until the mid 1980s, the Birla Group of companies dominated the scene, accounting for 40 percent of overseas FDI. The Tata Group of companies, though larger than the Birla Group domestically, accounted for about 11 percent and Thapar Group (textile and palm oil) accounted for 7 percent of the total value of ODI (Lall 1986 acquisitions and they accounted for over 80 percent of the total value of acquisitions (FICCI 2006; Goldstein 2009 ). Though the degree of concentration has declined somewhat, the top 15 firms still account for about 74 percent of the total value of acquisitions during 2010-14 (Table 7) .
The largest overseas acquisitions by Indian companies include Bharti Airtel's purchase in 2010 of the African assets of Zain, a mobile-telecoms firm (US$ 10.7 billion); the Tata Group's purchases of Corus Steel (US$ 12.1 billion) and Jaguar Land Rover (US$ 2.5 billion); and the Aditya Birla Group's acquisition of the North American aluminium company Novelis (US$ 6 billion) ( Table 7) . These four deals account for a quarter of India's overseas acquisitions over the past half-decade. The ownership structure of greenfield ODI is relatively more diversified compared with that of acquisitions. The top 25 companies account for 61 percent of total investments undertaken during 2003-14 (Table 8 ). All these projects in manufacturing are in capital and skill-intensive industries.
Sources of competitive advantage
For successful overseas operation, a firm must possess a set of assets or skills ("proprietary assets") that give it a competitive edge over local firms. Proprietary assets are of two types: firm-specific advantages and country-specific advantages (Dunning 2000; Rugman and Doh 2008) . The proprietary advantages of developed-country MNEs rest on assets built up by research efforts and considerable investment in the context of a large mature domestic market. Therefore, the standard proprietary asset models that were developed to explain the global reach of these firms offer little help in understanding the competitive advantages of EMNEs, which have not gone through an evolutionary process in their home countries. The pioneers of the literature on EMNEs therefore resorted to an eclectic approach to examining the expanding operation of these firms. This approach essentially relied on an analysis of firm behavior in the specific business environments in developing countries (Lecraw 1977; Lall 1983; Wells 1983) . The consensus view was that the competitive edge of EMNEs rests on country-specific advantages, competencies gained within their home countries.
In his pioneering studies of overseas investment by Indian manufacturing enterprises, Sanjaya Lall (1982) argued that technological expertise developed by producing for the domestic market under heavy tariff protections is the prime source of competitive advantage of these enterprises in their overseas locations. Based on a firm-level survey, however, Rajiv Lall (1986) found that it was not the technology embodied in indigenous machinery but the availability of a pool of less expensive but competent Indian managers and technicians that placed them at a healthy competitive position in developingcountry conditions. Based on a detailed comparative study, Ramamurti and Singh (2009) identified four different generic strategies, each based on different set of competitive advantages, adopted by Indian non-oil firms for overseas expansion since the 1990s. First, some firms, such as the automaker Mahindra and Mahindra, followed the "local optimizer" strategy-that is, to develop products and processes optimized for the Indian market and then leverage them in other emerging markets. 5 A second group of firms, such as software services companies like Infosys and Wipro, follow the "low-cost partner" strategy by leveraging India's low-cost advantage, particularly in managerial and technical personnel, to serve the needs of firms and consumers in rich countries. Third, companies in steel and other metal industries, such as Tata Steel and the aluminium company Hindalco, used the "global consolidator" strategy through horizontal acquisitions across emerging as well as rich country markets. Finally, a minority of firms like Suzlon Energy, a wind-power company, adopted what is called the "global first-mover strategy" by combining state-of-the-art technologies developed in advanced countries with the Indian low-cost manufacturing and engineering capabilities. Overall, the main source of competitive advantage for firms following any of these strategies is country-specific rather than firm-specific. Based on this typology, Ramamurti and Singh (2009) concluded that available evidence does not lead to a very clear or strong inference of monopolistic advantages possessed by Indian MNEs.
In sum, it is not an oversimplification to say that the internationalization of Indian firms is underpinned by a common set of country-specific competitive advantages. Most, if not all, of them have yet to develop firm-specific advantages. Their country-specific competitive advantages are a mixture of technological adoptive capacity built through several decades and inexpensive brainpower, a seasoned managerial class, and a historically rooted entrepreneurial tradition. Following the liberalization reforms of the early 1990s, significant relaxation of restrictions on overseas investment and unprecedented access to capital set the stage for the rapid global spread of Indian firms based on these country-specific advantages.
Motives for overseas expansion
Competitive advantage is a necessary precondition (enabling factor) but not sufficient for a firm for successful overseas operation. Not every firm that develops its own specific advantages or access to country-specific advantages undertakes overseas investment because they have the option of exporting from home base or simply focusing on expanding in the home country. What then are the factors that propel firms in investing abroad?
There is evidence that the constraining effects of government policy on business operations played a pivotal role in the emergence of Indian MNEs during the importsubstitution era. During this period, many big industrial houses in India felt constrained not by the lack of profitable market opportunities at home, but by government legislation that created market imperfections and distortions affecting their ability to expand, diversify, and export. Based on interviews conducted in 1982 with 17 parent companies, Lall (1986) found that the desire to escape the constraining effects of government policy was the most important motivation behind overseas investment by these firms. In particular, the firms he interviewed specifically mentioned the MRTP Act as the main impetus behind their decision to invest abroad. Only one-third of the firms indicated that they went abroad to open new markets and/or protect an existing one. Given the negative impact of trade and industry policies on the competitiveness of exporting from India at the time, diversification by export was not an option for Indian firms. To the extent that government policies raised costs and adversely affected export performance, they also indirectly provided an incentive for Indian firms to invest abroad. Thus, direct investment appeared as a logical means of escaping the domestic business environment.
In the more open economic environment since the 1990s, drivers of overseas expansion of Indian firms would certainly have become more complex, and hence generalization from the studies undertaken during the closed-economy era is hazardous. Systematic analysis of the drivers of the new wave of ODI based on a representative sample of firms is yet to be undertaken. Nevertheless, the available limited evidence seems to suggest that escaping the domestic business environment still remains a dominant driver of ODI by Indian firms. For instance, according to a survey of 412 Indian ODI projects (identified from the fDi Markets database) by the Export and Import Bank of India (EXIBI 2014), an overwhelming number of overseas projects were motivated by the growth potential in host market (36 percent) and proximity to markets or customers (32 percent) (Figure 4) . The findings of a survey by the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the investment motives of business acquisitions by Indian firms are consistent with this inference (FICCI 2006) . Overall, considerations such as acquiring new technology and managerial skills and forging relationships with new clients that are directly relevant for strengthening the nexus of domestic and overseas operations on business do not seem to figure prominently in determining ODI. Though the post-1991 policy changes have gone a long way toward product market liberalization by easing entry barriers, the factor markets (labor and land) are still plagued by severe distortions and policy-induced rigidities (Crabtree 2012 ). In particular, India's archaic labor laws discourage large firms in manufacturing from choosing labor-intensive activities and technologies. A number of studies have noted a general bias in India's specialization pattern in favor of capital-and skill-intensive manufacturing and against unskilled labor-intensive industries. 6 This is an anomaly given the fact that the country's true comparative advantage lies in unskilled labor-intensive industries (Panagariya 2008) . Further, because of this pattern of idiosyncratic specialization, Indian manufacturing has been virtually locked out of the vertically integrated supply chains in dynamic global industries such as electronics, electrical goods, and medical devices (Athukorala 2014).
6 The overall incentive structure in India is biased against labor-intensive manufacturing for a number of reasons. Many argue that India's rigid labor laws that create severe exit barriers and discourage large firms from choosing labor-intensive activities and technologies are primarily responsible for the lack of dynamism in labor-intensive manufacturing (Kochhar et al. 2006; Panagariya 2008; Krueger 2010) . Some scholars question this prognosis (Bhattacharjea 2006) , but according to a number of empirical studies the role of labor laws as a source of capital intensity bias cannot be ignored (see Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy 2007; Aghion et al. 2008) . Other possible sources of capital-intensity bias include inadequate supply of physical infrastructure (especially power, roads, and ports) and a highly inefficient and cumbersome land acquisition procedure. Faced with power shortages, capital-and skill-intensive industries, such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals, tend to rely on high-cost internal sources of power. This option, however, is not available to to firms in labor-intensive segments, which typically operate with low margin. Similarly, land acquisition procedures also discourage large scale labor-intensive manufacturing.
In this context, as restrictions on overseas investments were relaxed, the leading firms operating in India's capital-and skill-intensive industries have begun to venture into developed countries, which provided the optimal endowment structure for their expansion. Naturally, developed countries have a comparative advantage in technology and skillintensive industries as these countries are abundantly endowed with knowledge stock, R&D, highly skilled human capital, supportive infrastructure, and institutions. These countries provide not only the ideal conditions for producing technologically sophisticated, differentiated, and dynamic product lines but also expanding markets for such products. This inference is consistent with the stylized facts emerging from our analysis of the sectoral composition and geographical distribution of Indian ODI. We have seen that skill-and technology-intensive industries and services accounted for an overwhelming share of foreign acquisitions by Indian companies and that the bulk of these investments were in developed countries.
Concluding remarks
India has a history of outward FDI dating back to the late 1950s, but total outflows remained small during the ensuing four decades. Following the liberalization reforms, outflows started to increase rapidly from about the mid 1990s. In particular, there has been a real surge in outflows since about 2005 following significant dismantling of foreign exchange restrictions on capital transfers for acquisition of foreign ventures. Notwithstanding the rapid global spread in recent years, Indian firms are, however, still at the formative stage of their global operations. Their competitive edge is still largely based on country-specific, rather than firm-specific, advantages, although there are some isolated cases of companies developing their own firm-specific advantages. Overall, they seem to be complementary to, rather than directly competing with, developed-country MNEs in their global operations.
The evidence harnessed in this paper from various scattered sources suggests that the "second wave" of overseas expansion by Indian firms is one of the perverse consequences of following "comparative advantage-defying" policies in the past. There is a fundamental disconnect between India's industrial structure and its endowment structure in that despite being a labor-abundant country India tended to specialize in capital-and skillintensive industries and services. India's overseas FDI seems to help perpetuate the distorted industrial structure inherited from the dirigisme era. This is in sharp contrast to the patterns of overseas FDI in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea at a comparable early stage of their economic transformation and that of China over the past two decades. In these countries, overseas FDI played a vital complementary role in the process of industrial transformation in the domestic economy in line with changes in factor market conditions. Economic reforms since 1991 have not been comprehensive enough to reduce, let alone eliminate, this fundamental structural anomaly in the Indian economy.
There is also evidence that domestic push factors arising from a poor investment climate continue to play an important role in Indian firms' decision to go overseas. To the extent that outward FDI takes place for such "negative reasons," the phenomenon may be regarded as a disguised form of capital flight. To the extent that the "push" factors drive overseas FDI, naturally there is a costly trade-off between overseas investment and domestic investment. Economic viability of new overseas acquisitions and the compatibility of emerging trends of MNE-related trade flows with the comparative advantage of the national economy are other issues with potentially significant returns to research.
